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Abstract 
This article examines why the UK Government accepted the 2014 Scottish independence referendum 
while the Spanish Government opposes a similar referendum in Catalonia. Adopting a most similar 
research design, we argue that the variation is best explained by perceived political opportunities by the 
two ruling parties. These are embedded in different conceptions of the state and constitutional designs, 
mostly mononational in Spain and mostly plurinational in the UK but multiple and contested in both cases. 
In Spain, vote-seeking calculations incentivise the Popular Party to oppose a referendum, while its 
mononational conception of the state and the Spanish constitutional design provide a further constraint 
and a discursive justification for their position. In the UK, David Cameron's accommodating position was 
based on the view that the Scottish referendum was low risk -as support for independence was minimal- 
with a high reward: the annihilation of the independence demand. The Conservatives have recently 
adopted a more restrictive position because seeming political advantage has changed. The findings 
suggest that independence referendums will continue to be rare events.  
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Why did the UK Government permit the 2014 Scottish independence referendum while 
the Spanish Government has continued to oppose a similar referendum in Catalonia? 
The demand for an independence referendum is the same, devolved institutions are 
similar, and in neither case is there a constitutional right to self-determination. What 
then is the explanatory factor? We cast doubt on explanations focusing exclusively on 
legal differences and put forward the argument that the variation is best explained by 
perceived political opportunities by the ruling parties, albeit rooted in different 
conceptions of the state and constitutional designs.  
Almost simultaneously, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat UK Government and 
the Popular Party-led Spanish Government faced claims of a mandate for independence 
referendums in Scotland and Catalonia. The 2011 Scottish election delivered a Scottish 
National Party (SNP) majority government as the party won 69 seats out of 129. The SNP 
claimed that the result provided a clear mandate because their manifesto included the 
commitment to bring forward an independence referendum bill (SNP 2011: 28). 
Evidence shows that increase in SNP support was the result of the perception that the 
party provided Scotland with effective government rather than an increase in support 
for independence (Curtice 2011: 58-65). The election results paved the way for a new 
stage of the constitutional debate in Scotland focused on independence. Under the 
Edinburgh Agreement (2012), the UK and Scottish Governments worked together to 
ensure that a referendum on independence for Scotland would take place. Since the 
constitution is a reserved matter, meaning that the Scottish Parliament does not have 
the competence to act in this area, the UK Government temporarily transferred the 
powers to hold a referendum to the Scottish parliament using a process known as the 
Section 30 Order (HM Government 1998).  
 In Catalonia, the then-President Artur Mas (Convergence and Union, CiU) called 
a snap election in 2012 and campaigned on the promise to deliver a referendum and to 
begin building the structures of the future Catalan state (CiU 2012: 12). This was a major 
shift in the traditionally moderate stance of the party on the constitutional question, 
which consisted in pushing for more autonomy without renouncing participation in 
state-level politics. The broader Catalan political context was characterised by the rise 
in public support for independence and the intense mobilisation of the pro-
independence camp (Rico and Liñeira 2014: 272-76). CiU lost 12 seats but Catalan 
nationalists claimed that the election delivered a mandate for an independence 
referendum because pro-referendum parties collectively achieved a comfortable 
majority. CiU and the pro-independence Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) together 
won 71 MPS, a majority of three; the Catalan greens (IC-V), which also supported a 
referendum although it was not their main concern, obtained 13 seats; and the far-left 
pro-independence CUP obtained 3 seats (Martí 2013). The demand for a Catalan 
independence referendum met with the opposition of the PP Government, a position 
which has remained unaltered. 
In this article, we seek to explain the presence and absence of a negotiated 
independence referendum in Scotland and Catalonia. We consider three factors: 
institutional constraints with regards to the constitutional possibility to hold an 
independence referendum; ideational constraints concerning the conception of the 
state that permeates constitutional precepts and party ideologies; and strategic 
constraints with regards to political opportunity considerations by the central 
governments, on the assumption that parties are vote-maximising rational actors which 
adopt the position they believe will gain them the most votes. Our main argument is 
that perceived political opportunity is the necessary explanatory factor to account for 
the variation. We suggest that the degree of constitutional flexibility on the issue of self-
determination and the mononational or plurinational conception of the state are critical 
but not determinant factors. They are critical because they are background conditions 
shaping the institutional and ideational constraints through which ruling parties may 
operate, but they are not determinant because they would lead to nothing unless these 
parties perceive that it is to its political advantage to accept the holding of an 
independence referendum.  
This article addresses the academic conversation in nationalism studies and 
territorial politics about independence movements in plurinational states. A significant 
amount of scholarship has focused and provided valuable insights on the determinants, 
strategies, claims and dynamics of the Catalan and Scottish independence movements 
(Serrano 2013; Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013; Lluch 2014; Boylan 2015; Burg 2015; Gillespie 
and Gray 2015; Liñeira and Cetrà 2015; Henderson, Jeffery and Liñeira 2015; Barrio and 
Rodríguez-Teruel 2017; Keating 2017; McCrone 2017; Pattie and Johnson 2017; Walker 
2017). Here we propose to approach the issue from the perspective of the state, placing 
the emphasis on the state responses to independence referendum demands. Thus, the 
article resonates with the growing literature on majority nationalism and majority 
groups and their role in nationalist disputes (Kaufmann and Haklai 2008; Resnick 2008; 
Lecours and Nootens 2011; Gagnon et al. 2011; Orgad 2016; Basta 2017). 
This article is structured as follows. First, we present our research design and 
approach. Second, we examine the variation in the responses to demands for 
independence referendums by the Spanish and UK Governments. We place an emphasis 
on the type of arguments used to accept and oppose the demand, and the consequences 
for the political dynamics in the two contexts. Third, we examine systematically three 
competing explanatory factors – the constitution, conception of the state, and political 
opportunity – reducing them in the process and ending with the most convincing, 
political opportunity.  
 
Research Design 
We adopt a most similar research design to explain the variation in the responses to 
demands for independence referendums in Spain and the UK. In formal terms, this 
variation is our explanandum. The most similar design facilitates the ceteris paribus rule 
by reducing the number of possible explanations and allowing us to focus on the 
variation across the cases (Teune and Przeworksi 1970: 32-34; Della Porta 2008; Keman 
and Pennings 2014), although we recognise its limitations in a world of multiple 
causalities. 
Spain and the UK are a common comparison in the literature on nationalism and 
territorial politics (see, for example, Keating 2001; Keating et al. 2003; Guibernau 2006; 
Swenden 2006; Swenden and Toubeau 2013). The two have a number of significant 
similarities and differences. For the purposes of explaining different state responses to 
self-determination demands, we consider that the two cases share a number of key 
similarities and we seek to explain the variation by examining those which differ. The 
similarities are wide-ranging: Spain and the UK are west-European democracies; both 
have decentralised, asymmetric systems; both are plurinational, with claims in at least 
two territorially distinct communities of being separate political communities; both have 
conservative governments at the centre which draw support on the issue of state unity; 
and in neither case is there a constitutional right to self-determination. Significant 
differences include the codified and rigid constitution in the Spanish case compared with 
the uncodified UK constitution, a factor which has been often considered the primary 
reason for the differing state responses. The predominantly plurinational conception of 
the union in the UK, where claims to Scottishness and Britishness reside simultaneously, 
often within the concepts, is also in contrast with a principally mononational conception 
of the state in Spain. In Spain, the territorial agenda is a salient electoral issue and a 
matter of party competition also at the state-wide level. There are also relevant 
differences with regard to the secessionist units themselves. For instance, when it 
comes to their relative demographic and economic weight vis-à-vis the rest of the state, 
Scotland has a population share of only 8.2% and a GDP share of 8% against 16% and 
20% for Catalonia. 
Our research approach focuses on examining three factors or explanans with 
may potentially explain the variation: the role of the constitution; the (contested) 
conceptions of state; and political opportunism. We adopt a contextualised approach, 
exploring the relevance of these factors as they play out in the specific British and 
Spanish legal and political contexts. We treat the three factors as institutional, 
ideational, and strategic opportunity structures delimiting the acceptable framework 
within which state responses can be articulated. We adopt a form of ‘Occam’s Razor’, 
systematically going through competing explanations, reducing them in the process, and 
settling upon the most persuasive and parsimonious: political opportunism. While this 
is a case-oriented comparison and we do not claim to draw conclusions beyond the two 
cases we examine, we are satisfied that the analysis provides a high level of internal 
validity and that it provides general insights for the fields of nationalism studies and 
territorial politics about the factors explaining the resistance or accommodation of 
independence referendum demands in similar contexts. 
 
Responses to Demands for Independence Referendums in Spain and the UK  
Resistance: The Position of the Spanish Government 
The Spanish Government has consistently maintained that there cannot be a Catalan 
independence referendum. The dominant argument is that the Spanish constitution 
enshrines the indivisibility of the Spanish nation and establishes that national 
sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people as a whole. As a result, even if there were to 
be a referendum, the franchise should extend across the whole of Spain and not be 
limited to Catalonia. A Catalan referendum would be ‘an illegal act’ and a ‘violation’ of 
national sovereignty, according to Spanish PM Mariano Rajoy (Calleja 2017). In its 2015 
manifesto, the PP stressed that ‘the unity of the Spanish nation is the principle 
grounding our democracy’ and that the party ‘guarantees and will always guarantee that 
neither Spain nor our national sovereignty be chopped’ (PP 2015: 7). Facing demands 
for a Catalan referendum which are typically grounded on democratic arguments, the 
Spanish Government’s answer equated law-enforcement with democracy. Indeed, the 
Spanish Vice-President Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría has repeatedly argued that there is 
no democracy beyond the law (EFE 2014). The Spanish government explicitly rejected 
the Scottish precedent precisely on the grounds that Spain, unlike the UK, has a codified 
constitution that enshrines the unity of the state.  
 The focus on the unconstitutionality of a Catalan referendum and the need to 
obey the law is complemented with references to the dramatic consequences of 
independence itself. Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy has argued that Catalan 
independence would be detrimental for Catalans as it would imply the exit from the 
European Union, the common market, and the Euro (Rodríguez 2017). There have also 
been calls for preserving the emotional and cultural ties binding Catalans and the rest 
of Spaniards after centuries of living together. The combination of the legal argument 
and the political preference is best captured by Rajoy’s recurrent answer that he ‘cannot 
and does not want to’ allow the holding of a Catalan independence referendum 
(Moncloa 2017). The Spanish Government’s position is shared by all state-wide parties 
except the leftist coalition Unidos Podemos (Together We Can). This coalition is formed 
by Podemos, United Left, and smaller parties.  
In April 2014, a delegation of the Catalan Parliament formally asked the Spanish 
Parliament to transfer the powers to hold a legal referendum to Catalonia, a demand 
that echoed the mechanism used by the UK Government to transfer the competence to 
the Scottish Parliament. Under the current Spanish constitution, referendums can only 
be called by the central government in Madrid. An overwhelming majority of 299 
Spanish MPs voted against it, including the main opposition Socialist party –PSOE, and 
only 46 voted in favour. After the 2015 Spanish election, one of the reasons why a leftist 
coalition between Podemos and PSOE with the external support of other parties did not 
materialise is that Podemos established the holding of a Catalan independence 
referendum as a sine qua non requirement to form a government, while the PSOE 
opposes such a referendum.  
The strategy of the Spanish Government has mostly consisted of resorting to 
challenges via the Constitutional Court. In September 2014, the Catalan Parliament 
passed a law on non-referendum popular consultations to hold a non-binding 
independence vote on 9 November 2014. The Spanish Government challenged the law 
in the Court, which ruled the vote illegal five days before it was held. However, the 
Government ultimately tolerated the vote when the Catalan Government called it on 
the basis of article 40.2 of the law, which had not been appealed by the Spanish 
government. The vote, which came to be known as the ‘participation process’, was more 
an act of protest by the pro-independence side than a decisive test on independence as 
it was boycotted by most unionists (Liñeira and Cetrà 2015: 263). In March 2017, then-
President Artur Mas was found guilty by Catalonia’s High Court of disobeying the 
Spanish Constitutional Court and was fined and banned from holding public office for 
two years (García 2017). Three other members of the Catalan Government were also 
found guilty and, in October 2017, the then-President of the Catalan Parliament, Carme 
Forcadell, was indicted for contempt and neglect of duty for allowing the pro-
independence ‘roadmap’ to be put to a vote in July 2016.  
 Partly as a result of the Spanish Government’s unaltered position, there was a 
progressive shift in the discursive focus of the Catalan pro-independence camp. The 
initial demand of ‘the right to decide’ (that is, exercising self-determination by holding 
an independence referendum) was progressively replaced with the goal of 
independence, although both still coexist ambiguously in the pro-independence 
discourse. This shift enhanced divisions within the pro-independence camp. After the 
2014 ‘participation process’ there were public disagreements between CDC (Democratic 
Convergence of Catalonia) and ERC about the next step. The ‘plebiscitary elections’ in 
November 2015 set the far-left pro-independence CUP as kingmaker as the Together for 
Yes (JxS) pro-independence coalition fell short of a majority. The CUP vetoed Mas’s 
candidacy due to profound ideological disagreements, thus fulfilling their electoral 
promise of not re-electing him as president. JxS and the CUP struck a deal the day before 
the deadline which allowed CDC to keep the presidency with Carles Puigdemont while 
the CUP secured a parliamentary majority for JxS (Martí and Cetrà 2016).  
Another consequence of the shift from demanding a referendum to seeking 
independence was the emergence of tensions between the parties supporting 
independence outright and the parties supporting the principle of a referendum but not 
necessarily independence – this is the case with regards to the Catalan Greens (IC-V), 
the Catalan branch of Podemos, and other small parties. The need for large political 
majorities within Catalonia, together with the difficulties of achieving unilateral 
independence, contributed to the Catalan Government’s decision to shift back the focus 
to the referendum. On October 1st 2017, the Catalan government held an independence 
referendum in which voters were asked the question ‘Do you want Catalonia to become 
an independent state in the form of a Republic?’. The vote was opposed by the Spanish 
government on the same grounds than the 2014 poll and the Constitutional Court 
suspended the referendum law. The Catalan government estimated the final turnout to 
be 43% (2.3 million). Among those who voted, 90.2% voted Yes and 7.8% voted No. The 
vote and the reaction by the Spanish Government, which sought to stop the vote 
through police intervention including episodes of violence, deepened the constitutional 
crisis to levels without precedents in democratic Spain. At the time of writing, this is an 
ongoing dispute. The Spanish Government imposed direct rule on Catalonia and called 
an early election in Catalonia on the 21st of December 2017. 
 
Accommodation: The Position of the UK Government 
In contrast with the position of the Spanish Government, the UK Government allowed 
the Scottish Parliament to organise and hold an independence referendum in 
September 2014. The relationship between the UK Government and Parliament at 
Westminster and the devolved institution at Holyrood in Edinburgh in relation to the 
constitutional question is more flexible than that of their Spanish counterparts. The 
caveat here is that this position has changed recently, a point to which we will return 
later. The debate in Scotland accelerated when the SNP were elected to minority 
government in 2007, establishing a consultation to consider independence and to 
engage the civil service and the public in the debate (Harvey and Lynch 2012: 92). Rather 
than ignoring the issue, the unionist parties in Scotland engaged in the debate – albeit 
on their own terms, with their own commission – and when the SNP returned a majority 
in 2011, that engagement in the debate became more formalised.  
  The 2014 referendum was organised with the full support of the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat UK Government, with the rules governing its operation outlined in a 
document which became known as the Edinburgh Agreement (2012). Between the two 
governments, decisions were made upon the franchise for the referendum, the number 
of options and questions allowed on the ballot, and a deadline by which the vote had to 
be held, with the power transferred to the Scottish Parliament via a Section 30 Order. A 
staunch Unionist with Scottish ancestry, the then-Prime Minister David Cameron 
presented his arguments to accede to a referendum in a 2014 speech: 
 
 "I felt, as the prime minister of the UK, I had a choice. I could either say to them 
'well you can't have your referendum, it is for us to decide whether you should 
have one.' I think that would have led to an almighty and disastrous battle 
between the Westminster parliament and the UK government and the Scottish 
government and the Scottish first minister. So I did what I thought was the right 
thing, which was to say 'you voted for a party that wants independence, you 
should have a referendum that is legal, that is decisive and that is fair.'" (Watt 
2014). 
 
 Cameron was not afraid to allow the public’s view on significant constitutional 
issues to be heard and actioned: he held referendums on electoral reform, additional 
powers for the Welsh Assembly, Scottish independence, and EU membership (Qvortrup 
2015: 35).  While – as the quote above suggests – he was able to portray this positioning 
as magnanimous and respectful to democratic ideals, much of this was informed by 
what he saw as ‘low risk, high reward’ politics. The topics he put to the public were easy 
wins for him as his own positioning was broadly in line with public opinion. Polls 
suggested that only 30% of the Scottish public supported independence, and a 
referendum was an easy way to defeat the SNP and independence while also 
strengthening his democratic credentials: multiple wins (Qvortrup 2015: 36-37).   
With a turnout of 84.6%, the referendum engaged the population at a record 
level for an election or referendum under universal suffrage. The outcome – the defeat 
of the independence proposal by 55.3% to 44.7% – saw just over 2 million people vote 
to remain in the UK, against 1.6 million who voted to leave. Nevertheless, the UK 
General Election in May 2015 strengthened the SNP’s hand on the constitutional 
question after the party’s remarkable performance (Cetrà and Harvey 2017). While in 
2010 the party had secured 6 seats in constituencies which had historically seen high 
support, in 2015 the SNP returned 56 of Scotland’s 59 MPs, reducing Labour, the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats to a solitary Scottish seat each. Herein, a clear 
message: Scottish voters were not convinced by independence, but did support the SNP 
as a means of ensuring that, in the party’s words, ‘Scotland’s voice would be heard’ in 
Westminster (Harvey 2015). The 2016 Scottish Parliament election saw the SNP 
returned to government in Scotland, albeit as a minority. However, the increase in seats 
for the Scottish Greens (+4) has maintained a pro-independence majority among MSPs 
(Anderson 2016).  
The UK Government sought to dampen support for independence by further 
extending autonomy to the Scottish Parliament. The taxation provisions of the Scotland 
Act 2012 were enacted after the 2016 election, and further powers were devolved in 
the aftermath of the independence referendum and the Smith Commission, the latter a 
key promise made by the Unionist parties to provide more power to the Scottish 
Parliament in the event of a vote to remain in the UK. The UK Government’s intention 
on the constitutional issue was to seek to accommodate demands for further autonomy 
within the framework of devolution and to allow the Scottish Parliament the 
opportunity to legislate freely within its areas of competence. This position was detailed 
fully in an agreement reached between the Scottish Government and the UK 
Government in February 2016 (HM Government/Scottish Government 2016). 
However, in the wake of the EU referendum in which Scotland’s vote to remain 
was overruled by the UK-wide vote to leave, the Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
noted that Scotland’s view had not been respected, and that for her, all constitutional 
options were ‘on the table’, including a second independence referendum (Sturgeon 
2016). When the Scottish Government’s recommendations on EU negotiations were 
ignored by the UK Government, the First Minister went further and indicated her 
intention to begin a process that would allow Scotland to hold a second independence 
referendum by the end of spring 2019. The UK Prime Minister Theresa May, who 
replaced David Cameron after the EU referendum, responded by saying ‘now is not the 
time’ (Johnson, S 2017), implying that consent for a second referendum would not be 
withheld indefinitely, but that consent would not be forthcoming in short order. 
Nevertheless, in March 2017 the Scottish Parliament gave its backing for a Section 30 
Order, which would again temporarily transfer the power to hold a referendum to the 
Scottish Parliament. Since those developments, Theresa May sought her own mandate 
as PM, but failed to secure a majority in a hastily-arranged 2017 General Election. The 
SNP lost ground – falling from the 56 seats won in 2015 to 35, albeit still retaining a 
majority of Scottish MPs – while the Conservative resurgence in Scotland (+12) was not 
enough to deliver a majority for the PM at UK level. The UK Government position on a 
second referendum has hardened, taking a more intransigent line reminiscent of the 
Spanish government’s position on a Catalan vote, and therefore the variation in state 
responses that we saw in 2014 has now diminished. 
 
Explaining Accommodation and Resistance in the UK and Spain 
Institutional Factor: The Constitution 
This factor refers to whether it is legal for Catalonia and Scotland to hold independence 
referendums. The variation in the responses of the two central governments might be 
explained because the Spanish codified constitution clearly prohibits independence, 
while the UK lacks a codified constitution which allows for a much more flexible 
constitutional practice. The arguments provided by the Spanish Government in relation 
to the Catalan demand point to this factor. We argue that, while this factor provides 
significant weight to the explanation, it is not determinant.  
Control over constitutional matters is a reserved competence in both cases. 
Nevertheless, the UK government ceded temporary control over the issue to the 
Scottish Parliament in 2014, a development with no constitutional precedent in the UK. 
The historical and conventional conception of sovereignty as in the ‘crown in parliament’ 
means that Westminster retains the power to overrule the Scottish Parliament on both 
reserved and devolved matters (HM Government 1998). This principle was reinforced 
through the UK Supreme Court’s judgement on Miller v the Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union (24 January 2017). The Scottish Government had sought 
involvement in the negotiation process, but this was denied by both the UK Government 
and the Supreme Court, according to which the UK Government would be the sole 
representative of the UK in these discussions although the UK Parliament would have a 
final say on the agreed deal. Using the Edinburgh Agreement as a precedent, the Scottish 
Government insisted that the UK Government had been prepared to share sovereignty 
on that occasion and should be prepared to do so in this case. The rejection of this 
demand is more in line with the traditional, Diceyan conception of sovereignty that the 
UK Parliament is sovereign and that sovereignty should not be shared. Further, Dicey 
argued that ‘in theory, parliament has total power’, a principle that, though not without 
contestation, suggests that even with the establishment of the devolved institutions, 
the UK Parliament remains the supreme legal authority in the UK (Dicey 1885).  As a 
result, it is unlikely that any referendum on independence could occur without the prior 
agreement of the UK Government – an agreement that appears not to be forthcoming 
in the immediate future. 
This is an important point because it emphasises the fact that the flexibility of 
the constitution only plays a partial role in allowing for such shared competence. The 
UK constitution relies on precedent and convention, and referendums tend to be utilised 
in an ad hoc manner when it is perceived to be in the interests of the government (House 
of Lords 2010). Thus, the UK government’s commitment to allowing the component 
nations of the UK the opportunity to exercise self-determination is not an intrinsic part 
of the constitution, but a position arrived at to achieve the maximum possible political 
leverage. As noted above, a Section 30 order that gave the Scottish Parliament the 
temporary power to hold a referendum was a change to the constitutional competences 
of the institution. The flexibility afforded by the constitution allowed the UK 
Government to pursue this course with limited fuss. However, the minority SNP 
Government – in office from 2007-11 – had tried and failed to achieve the same 
concession from the UK Government prior to the Edinburgh Agreement. 
In Spain, relevant sections of the 1978 Spanish written constitution appear to 
preclude a Catalan referendum. Crucially, the Spanish constitution declares ‘the Spanish 
people’ as the subject of sovereignty (CE 1978: art. 1.2) and establishes that ‘the 
Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and 
indivisible homeland of all Spaniards’ (ibid: art. 2). The dominant jurisprudence of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court, at least since 2008, also appears to preclude a 
referendum. In its ruling 103/2008 on the Basque law to hold a popular consultation 
about opening a process of negotiation on ‘political normalisation’, the Court 
unanimously decided that any popular consultation affecting the subject of sovereignty 
requires a reform of the constitution. The Court has reiterated this decision in several 
occasions afterwards (see, for example, the ruling 31/2015). Constitutional reform is 
complex because the Spanish constitution is rigid, which means that the process for its 
reform is lengthy and complex. Indeed, its amendment requires a majority of 2/3 both 
in the Spanish Congress and the Senate, the calling of new elections, a majority of 2/3 
in the two newly elected chambers, and approval via statewide referendum. 
However, a number of constitutional specialists have suggested that there are 
constitutional channels to hold a legal independence referendum in Catalonia, although 
they concede that it would have to be consultative and non-binding – technically, 
referendums in the UK are also consultative but, in practice, they are politically binding. 
This is a technical debate among constitutional specialists and it is not our aim to explore 
its intricacies in detail here, but simply to show that there is not unanimity among 
experts on this matter, although we recognise that the view that an independence 
referendum is constitutionally possible is a minority position in the whole of Spain 
mostly advocated by Catalan constitutional lawyers. To illustrate, some draw attention 
to the possibility of transferring the competence to hold a consultative and non-binding 
referendum to the Catalan Government under article 150.2 of the Spanish constitution, 
which states that the State may transfer or delegate to the Autonomous Communities 
some of its powers (Arbós 2014). Francisco Rubio Llorente (2012) conceded that the 
Catalan Government cannot legally organise an independence referendum but argued 
that the Catalan Parliament should present an organic law proposal to authorise such 
referendum, a legal capacity recognised in the constitution. Others argue for using the 
procedure for consultative referendums in Article 92 of the Constitution, which states 
that especially significant political decisions may be submitted to referendum (Cagiao y 
Conde and Ferraiuolo 2016). Yet others draw on particular interpretations of the 
democratic principle enshrined in the constitution (Manifesto Catalan Lawyers 2017). 
There is no doubt that constitutional differences between the two cases are 
relevant to explain the divergent reactions in Spain and the UK to demands for 
independence referendums. It is contentious whether a Catalan independence 
referendum could be legally held under the Spanish constitution, and there is not a 
political majority to support the start of the lengthy process of constitutional reform to 
allow a Catalan independence referendum. In light of the discussion above, however, 
we argue that the constitution is not a determinant factor to explain the variation. In 
the UK, temporary constitutional change was necessary to hold the 2014 Scottish 
referendum. Indeed, there is nothing intrinsic in British constitutional practice to 
suggest that demands for self-determination referendums should be addressed – and 
they have been ignored in the past, most recently when the SNP ran a minority 
government in Edinburgh between 2007 and 2011. In Spain, while it is clear that the 
constitutional design is much more dissuasive on this issue, accommodating the demand 
for a Catalan referendum is legally possible, whether within certain precepts and 
interpretations of the present constitution or with a new constitutional setting. The fact 
that legal aspects are not the whole story suggests that we must take into account 
political factors. 
 
Ideational Factor: Conception of the State 
This factor refers to whether the Spanish and the UK constitutional designs and 
their interpretations by political parties display a mononational or plurinational view of 
the state. The variation in the responses of the two central governments might thus be 
explained because in the UK there is a predominantly plurinational view of the state, in 
which Scotland is a nation with the right to self-determination, while in Spain the 
dominant view is mononational. Here we argue that conception of the state is a critical 
but not a determinant factor either because there are multiple understandings of the 
union available in the two places. 
Nationalism scholars and liberal theorists have persuasively argued that 
nationhood is pervasively institutionalised in the practice of liberal democracies (Brown 
1999; Kymlicka 2001; Yack 2012; Dickhoff 2016: 33-49). Bernard Yack (2012: Chapter 1) 
has coined the useful notion of ‘the myth of the civic nation’ to make the point that the 
practice of liberal democracies is not only based on political notions such as choice and 
solidarity, which is the ideal of liberal theorists, but it also includes cultural elements and 
connections with pre-political identities. This puts into serious question notions such as 
‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas 1992) which propose loyalty to liberal democratic 
principles as the basis of the nation. The audience for constitutionally-focused 
patriotism is not some random association of individuals united only by allegiance to 
universal principles, but rather a specific national community with its own inherited 
cultural and historical features. Nationalism is thus an integral part of state institutions, 
while majority nationalism consists in ‘the articulation of a national community that 
usually has its core within the majority group and/or within the representations of the 
state’s national identity as that group sees it (notably through the elites)’ (Lecours and 
Nootens 2011: 10). In short, constitutions codify, rather than transcend, nationalism, 
and therefore explicitly legal arguments such as those of the Spanish Government are 
also inevitably political arguments comprising more or less implicit views over 
nationhood and sovereignty.  
In the Spanish case, the constitution shows a dominance of the mononational 
view of the state but also a significant degree of ambiguity which leaves room to 
multiple possible interpretations of the national question (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 
Chapter 3). The PP Government’s legal argument is based upon particular precepts 
emphasising the idea of Spain as an ‘indivisible nation’, and implicitly, a lack of 
recognition of any distinct nations existing within the Spanish territory. As mentioned 
above, the 1978 Spanish constitution declares that the Spanish nation is ‘based on the 
indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all 
Spaniards’ (CE 1978: art. 2). Minority nations in Spain can be seen as ‘nationalities’ but 
not nations, as Spain as a whole is the only nation. In these precepts, the Spanish nation 
is understood in homogeneous terms, a group of citizens as opposed to the sum of 
different peoples or nations (Álvarez Junco 2016: 192). The predominance of the 
majority identity is also reflected in the linguistic issue, a politically sensitive matter in 
Spain, as Article 3.1 declares Castilian the only official language throughout the state, 
which all Spaniards have the duty to know.  
There is, however, a significant degree of ambiguity in the Spanish constitution 
which allows for alternative national narratives to coexist, embedded in turn in different 
historical conventions and understandings about the nature of the state (Herrero de 
Miñon 1988, Álvarez Junco 2016: Chapter 3). The constitution does not declare Spain to 
be a plurinational state, but the reference to the right to self-government for ‘the 
nationalities and regions of which [Spain] is composed’ may be interpreted as the signal 
of a source of authority that precedes the constitution (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 
2010: 8). This interpretation could be supported by the fact that the Catalan government 
was re-established in 1977 before the passing of the Spanish Constitution, thus creating 
a link to Catalonia’s constitutional past. Indeed, the key ambiguity lies in the uncertain 
meaning of the term nationalities, a versatile semantic tool at the time given that ‘any 
reference to the existence of other nations within the Spanish nation would have been 
anathema for the right and the armed forces, while the demotion of the status of 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia to regions would have been unacceptable to 
the regional nationalists and the left’ (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 52). There are also 
references in the Spanish constitution to the ‘peoples’ of Spain in several passages, and 
there are calls to respect and protect Spain’s cultural richness in the Preamble and in 
Article 3. Finally, many expected that the distinction between ‘nationalities’ and 
‘regions’ would result in asymmetrical federal decentralisation that would de facto grant 
national recognition to minority nations (see Tierney 2004: 198-205; Guibernau 2004: 
Chapter 4).  
The ambivalence or duality of these constitutional precepts reflects the general 
willingness to reach a compromise after Franco’s Dictatorship (1939-75), the competing 
views of the constitutional committee over nationhood and sovereignty, and the 
correlation of political forces in 1978 (Heywood 1995). The disagreement about whether 
Spain contains one or more nations remains unsolved, and national recognition has 
arguably been the main historical demand of Catalan nationalism, together with 
linguistic and cultural protection. This has changed in recent years with the rise of the 
referendum and independence agendas. As suggested in the previous section, the PP’s 
party ideology is strictly mononational (PP 2015) while the leftist coalition Unidos 
Podemos is the only state-wide political force defending that Spain is plurinational and 
that Catalans are a distinct people with the ‘right to decide’ their political future in a 
referendum (Iglesias 2017). In June 2017, the PSOE adopted in its party congress the 
plurinational character of the state and the need for a federal reform of the constitution, 
but crucially added that sovereignty lies in the Spanish people as a whole and continues 
to oppose a Catalan referendum (Sánchez 2017). 
Catalonia’s position in terms of symbolic recognition is very different than that 
of Scotland. For, despite the lack of a single, codified constitution, Scotland's acceptance 
as a nation within the UK has never been in serious doubt (Bogdanor 1999: 115; Harvey 
2017: 152). The UK's argument with regards to Scotland is that it accepts the principle 
of Scotland as a nation, and broadly accepts its right to self-determination, though not 
without caveats. This is not a new circumstance – previous Conservative Prime Ministers 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major accepted that Scotland could secede from the Union 
(Keating and McEwen 2017: 9). Indeed, there has even been acceptance that Scotland 
could be a successful independent country from UK-wide politicians opposed to 
independence; the argument made is that it should not want to (Cameron 2012; Darling 
2012). Much of the ‘Unionist’ argument focuses upon the idea of the UK as a ‘Union of 
Nations’, of Britishness as an overarching identity, with Scottish, Welsh or English 
identities not inconsistent with the idea – indeed, a plurinational approach to identity 
has long operated in Northern Ireland (Keating 2001). Multiple national identities are 
unproblematic for the UK state, which is happy to incorporate and accommodate these 
attitudes if it helps to maintain the Union. Former Prime Minister David Cameron made 
regular interventions emphasising his family belong to clan Cameron, whose motto ‘let 
us unite’ played explicitly to his argument in favour of the Union (Cameron 2014), while 
his predecessor Gordon Brown also made much of his dual Scottish and British identities 
(Brown 2006). Theresa May has continually made reference to the UK as a ‘family of 
nations’ and a ‘Union of nations’, emphasising unity despite differences in national 
identity (May 2017).  This appeal to unionism is, in contrast with the Spanish case, not a 
predominantly legal argument but an appeal to emotional and historic ties that bind the 
nations within the state. The argument points to the fact that there is no constitutional 
barrier to secession, and constitutional change can occur – and, in fact, has occurred – 
in order to facilitate the possibility. In short, this conception speaks to a perception of 
the political union influenced by a more plurinational approach than the one mobilised 
by the Spanish Government. 
By contrast, there is a strand of British nationalism that, although not explicitly 
rejecting the status of nations for the constituent units, places them very much 
secondary to a more uniform and centralised concept of Britishness. This strand takes 
two broad forms. First, there is the version characterised by Ed Miliband’s ‘One Nation’ 
mantra when he led the Labour party (Miliband 2012). He emphasised the ties that bind 
the respective aspects of British identity, playing upon the institutions and shared values 
of the British state. Gordon Brown’s comments about ‘British jobs for British workers’, 
although more concerned with economic ideals, would also fit this conception – a more 
solidly collectivist approach to identity across the island(s) (Brown 2006).  This type of 
nationalism is less overt – a left-of-centre attempt to promote collectivism and solidarity 
across a broader populace. A second, more recent, conception focuses on internal 
solidarity as a means of promoting British interests in the negotiations on exiting the EU. 
Again, internal differences are not explicitly ignored but rather their importance is 
diminished in pursuit of a more unified conception of Britishness. Although Nigel Farage 
and UKIP have seen their electoral fortunes slide in the aftermath of the UK vote to leave 
the EU, this concept of Britishness is very much derived from their public 
pronouncements and can be seen in more contemporary Conservative rhetoric. Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson in particular has ploughed this furrow, arguing that leaving the 
EU meant the UK could finally ‘let the British lion roar’ (Johnson, B 2017).  This is a much 
more overtly nationalist position, homogenising the identity and utilizing the EU as the 
‘other’ which British nationalism should be defined against. Thus, while there is broad 
acceptance of the idea of plurinational identity in the UK, the promotion of a more 
formal ‘British’ identity has become increasingly common in political debate, particularly 
in the period since the EU referendum, and chimes more with the primarily 
mononational conception of the state in Spain.  
In conclusion, conception of the state is a critical factor in explaining the variation 
because legal precepts codify particular conceptions of the state and, in turn, political 
elites mobilise specific precepts to suit their understandings of the political union. 
However, conception of the state is not determinant in explaining the variation. While 
we have shown that mononationalism dominates in Spain and plurinationalism in the 
UK, in both cases there are different views of the political community available. As 
adopting and defending one conception or the other is ultimately the choice of political 
elites, we need to consider their calculations and incentives. 
 
Strategic Factor: Political Opportunity  
This factor refers to the strategic calculations of the ruling parties in Spain and the UK in 
order to maximise their political advantage. Drawing on insights developed by scholars 
in territorial politics (Meguid 2008; Alonso 2012; Toubeau and Massetti 2013), we 
identify two interrelated dimensions through which we can appraise the two cases. The 
first are the strategic calculations of the ruling elites vis-à-vis the incentives created by 
the party system. The second are the strategic calculations created by the dynamics of 
party competition. Political elites make decisions following a set of interests and 
objectives, and here we focus on their electoral logic of action (Toubeau and Massetti 
2013: 302). This logic is driven by the vote and office-seeking goals of parties, and the 
point is that the positions of the two central governments reflect strategies that seek to 
maintain their dominant position in their party systems vis-à-vis the pressures of party 
competition. We take the view that party strategies as defined by both issue position 
and issue saliency, while the ideology of the party determines whether the party’s 
primary dimension of electoral competition is the territorial or the ideological (Alonso 
2012: 13-40). In relation to strategic incentives, we draw on Meguid’s (2008) 
expectation that state-wide parties threatened by minority nationalist parties will 
respond by accommodating their demands in order to maximise their share of the vote 
and to undermine minority nationalist parties’ ownership of the national issue. Minority 
nationalist parties belong to a party family characterised by a shared commitment to 
sub-state territorial empowerment (Hepburn 2009) vis-à-vis state institutions. 
Conversely, state-wide parties not threatened by minority nationalist parties may adopt 
an adversarial strategy. To these two dimensions we add a third one, the incentives 
created by public attitudes, as we consider the views of the public – both within and 
outwith the territory demanding self-determination.  
The PP and the Conservative party are both centre-right state-wide parties which 
have traditionally been electorally unsuccessful in the minority nation, as evidenced by 
their share of the vote in local and sub-state elections in Catalonia and Scotland in 
relation to their electoral performance in the rest of the state. This is consistent with 
scholarship suggesting that devolution results in a distinct political arena in which 
minority nationalist parties tend to do well (Trench 2008: 21). Indeed, the two state-
wide parties are in opposition in Catalonia and Scotland and do not face strong 
prospects of incumbency. The strategic positioning of the Catalan branch of the PP, the 
Catalan Popular Party (PPC), mirrors that of the state-wide party in adopting a strong 
position in favour of the unity of the state and in making of it a salient issue of the party 
discourse. Yet, the PPC has become a marginal party in Catalan politics since Citizens 
(C’s) has overtaken their role as the main party ‘owning’ the issue of the unity of Spain 
and the constitutional order, at least in Catalan elections. As the PPC competes with C’s 
for the Catalan unionist political space, rather than with Catalan nationalist parties, the 
PP does not risk incurring in severe electoral losses by adopting a rigid stance on the 
demand for a Catalan independence referendum.  
Should the PP be willing to accommodate the demand for a referendum, the 
party would likely face severe electoral competition from C’s at the Catalan level and 
from this party and the PSOE at the Spanish level. Given that the territorial agenda is a 
salient electoral issue and a matter of party competition in Spain, these parties would 
present the move as a ‘concession’ to the ‘separatists’, and the PP could experience a 
loss of votes as the party’s core voters would feel that the party leadership is sacrificing 
the party’s ideology. Playing the adversarial card also helps the PP to increase the 
salience of the issue of territorial integrity in elections, which features prominently in 
the party’s ideology. In short, on this issue the PP does not face a tension between 
ideological purity and marginal vote-seeking (Toubeau and Massetti 2013: 306). Vote-
seeking calculations and the party’s conception of the state incentivise the PP to 
maintain their uncompromising position on the matter, while (their interpretation of) 
constitutional precepts provides a further constraint and a discursive justification for 
their position. 
The position of the Conservative party in Scotland can be contextualised in a 
similar but slightly different way. The decline of the party in Scotland through the 1980s 
and 1990s left them with no Scottish MPs in 1997. The proportional electoral system in 
the Scottish Parliament allowed for some recovery, but they remained weak in state-
wide elections in Scotland – until a moderate recovery in June 2017. David Cameron’s 
2012 agreement to hold an independence referendum was predicated upon his view 
that the Union would win a crushing victory, and that the demand for independence 
could be completely defeated. He was willing to take on what he believed was a low risk 
referendum for a high reward, as the advantage to the then-PM was twofold: he could 
maintain the unity of the UK while also providing a significant boost to his party’s 
position in Scotland’s party system. Here we can clearly see the dynamics of party 
competition influencing the strategic considerations of the governing party. The 
strategic decision of the PM was to take the opportunity to fatally wound the SNP and 
return the more conservative elements of their support to his party. 
The current UK Government takes a less accommodating view of the referendum 
question. Any acceptance of a second independence referendum by the UK Government 
would be a very risky venture because the independence option would begin any new 
referendum campaign from a base level of support of 45%. Therefore, the Conservative 
party is placing more emphasis on opposing a second referendum than on opposing 
independence, a position that falls closer to that of the Spanish Government. The defeat 
in the EU referendum, where they had expected to triumph and did not, has also 
contributed to the adoption of a position of resistance. At the sub-state level, the 
Scottish Conservatives have ceded the Scottish nationalist vote to the SNP and have 
focused more exclusively on the Union as the party’s ‘primary dimension of competition’ 
(Alonso 2012), heavily promoting their position as its main defenders. The party have 
outflanked Labour, positioning themselves as the primary exponents of the ‘no second 
independence referendum’ argument. Electorally, this has been a successful shift, and 
in the 2017 election they were rewarded with their best return of MPs since 1983. The 
electoral profitability of ‘owning’ the issue of the defence of the Union and opposing the 
SNP has underlined the shrewdness of this tactic, with Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
failing to mobilise as strongly on the issue. The electoral competition in this case is rather 
similar to that occurring in Catalonia and, as a result of both the Conservatives and the 
PP focusing on unionist voters, neither party is unduly threatened by the pro-
independence parties nor damaged by their position.  
In terms of public opinion, while we consider it to play a role in pushing political 
leaders in a particular direction, we argue that its role is secondary to political 
competition and party systems, and governments invoke it when they see it as justifying 
their stance. In addition, public opinion in the UK has been very volatile on this issue. 
There was widespread acceptance across the UK prior to the 2014 vote that Scotland 
should be able to hold a referendum (What Scotland Thinks 2012). In Catalonia, support 
for the right to hold a referendum amounts to around four-fifths of the electorate, while 
opinion in the rest of Spain constitutes a majority (65%-35%) against allowing a 
referendum (MyWord 2017), which results in an added constraint for the Spanish 
government. In both cases the responses of the two central governments were in tune 
with the majority of the population that they represent. However, since the Scottish 
referendum there has been a hardening of public opinion across the UK on this matter, 
which appears to be in line with the less accommodating position of the present 
Conservative Government. By May 2015, the majority view (52%) in England and Wales 
was that the UK Government should block a second independence referendum if it were 
to be requested before 2020 (What Scotland Thinks 2015). In addition, the potential for 
a Labour-SNP coalition in the aftermath of the 2015 UK General Election clearly 
damaged Labour electorally in England. Thus, currently public opinion across the state 
in both cases opposes an independence referendum and both state-wide parties are in 
tune with their wider publics on this issue.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have sought to explain why the UK Government permitted the 2014 
Scottish independence referendum while the Spanish Government opposes a similar 
referendum in Catalonia. We challenged the view that these responses are exclusively 
the result of the rigid Spanish constitutional setting compared with the flexibility of the 
UK constitution, suggesting that the legal constraints are relevant but not determinant 
to explain the variation. Our main argument has been that the necessary explanatory 
factor is perceived political opportunity by the two ruling parties. These are embedded 
in different constitutions and different conceptions of the state, mostly mononational 
in Spain and mostly plurinational in the UK but multiple and contested in both cases. 
The findings suggest that independence referendums agreed with the central 
government will continue to be rare events. The UK is comparatively exceptional in 
having a non-codified constitution and a predominantly plurinational view of the state, 
indeed a union of different political communities. We find this to be a generally 
favourable context in which central governments may acquiesce with independence 
referendums if they consider them to result in political advantage. Even if the PP 
considered that deploying an accommodating response would generate an optimal pay-
off, the party would be constrained by a party ideology averse to plurinationalism and 
territorial accommodation and a restrictive constitutional setting on the issues of 
territorial integrity and constitutional reform. Institutional and ideational flexibility are 
thus favourable conditions to accept independence referendums, but not sufficient 
factors. This is best shown by the fact that it is no longer the case that the UK 
Government perceives a political advantage in accommodating the demand for a 
Scottish referendum, as a result of which it has adopted a position of resistance.  
In comparative terms, it is difficult to imagine many situations in which ruling 
parties would maximise their electoral results by allowing the possibility of state 
disintegration. In addition, mononational views of the state are common in other 
contexts, and codified constitutions without the right to self-determination are the 
norm. The case of the UK in the period 2012-14 can thus be seen as exceptional because 
the explanatory constellation of institutional, ideational and (crucially) strategic factors 
were in place to accommodate the demand of an independence referendum. Of course, 
ruling parties may adopt more pluralistic conceptions of the state and may try to make 
legal frameworks more accommodating to self-determination demands. However, the 
close examination of the Spanish and UK cases suggests that central governments will 
continue to oppose independence referendum demands unless they perceive a 
powerful strategic incentive to accommodate such demand. 
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